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In recent years, historians and philosophers have become 
increasingly interested in the work of Bernard Bolzano, the 
nineteenth century Czech scholar who gave his name to the 
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and who anticipated Cauchy’s 
criterion for convergence. Within the last decade, two 
translations of parts of his philosophical magnum opus, the 
Wissenschaftslehre, have appeared. Now, thanks to the labors of 
a distinguished group of Bolzano scholars, some previously 
unpublished writings are being carefully edited and printed. 
The latest volume of the Gesamtausgabe will be especially 
interesting to historians and philosophers who are interested 
in the foundations of mathematics. It shows a serious and 
subtle attempt to tackle foundational issues which became, 
upwards of thirty years later, the concern of Dedekind, 
Weierstrass, Cantor and Frege. 
Bolzano’s “pure theory of numbers,” written about 1830, takes 
us from a definition of the concept of natural number to 
theorems which are analogous to the fundamental theorems of 
modern real analysis. The development of successive number 
systems occupies seven sections. Parts of the final section, 
which is also the longest, have previously appeared [Rychlfk 
19621. Not only the work of this section, but also other 
parts of Bolzano’s published work, will be better understood in 
the light of the new material presented in this volume. 
Some of Bolzano’s philosophical views are presupposed in his 
treatment of the number concept. In particular, it is important 
to understand that, for Bolzano, an expression can be meaningful 
(or, in his terms, “stand for an idea”) even though it lacks 
“ob j ective reference. ” To take a simple example, the phrase 
“the greatest prime number” is meaningful (it stands for a 
complex concept), even though it does not denote. This point is 
significant because one of Bolzano’s central claims is that 
many of the expressions used in analysis lack objective reference 
(although they stand for genuine concepts). 
The pure theory of numbers opens with a definition of 
1 natural number I in what we would call set-theoretic terms. 
Bolzano begins with the idea of a “concrete number” (p. 15). 
Concrete numbers are generated, successively, by taking a thing 
of a particular kind, adjoining to this another thing of the 
same kind, adjoining yet another thing of the same kind, and so 
forth. More precisely, a concrete number sequence is an 
infinite sequence < a, Ea,b}, {a,b,c), . . . > where a, b, c are 
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objects of the same kind; a concrete number is any member of 
any such sequence. (Obviously most concrete numbers are sets; 
some of Bolzano’s results require a slightly cumbersome formu- 
lation and proof because he does not take the first members of 
number sequences as unit sets .) Abstract numbers are properties 
shared by certain concrete numbers (p. 15). Thus the abstract 
number 1 is the property common to the initial members of all 
concrete number sequences. Contrary to what one might expect, 
abstract numbers do not play a major role in Bolzano’s system. 
The important notion is that of an indeterminate number 
(unbenannte Zahl) (p. 23). It is most helpful to think of this 
by considering indeterminate number expressions as indefinitely 
referring to appropriate concrete numbers. For example, the 
indeterminate expression ‘2’ indefinitely refers to each of the 
concrete 2’s; in asserting the equation ‘2 * 2 = 4’ we make a 
statement about the relations of all concrete 2’s and 4's (or, 
more exactly, about the relations of the 2 and 4 of each 
concrete number sequence). 
Bolzano argues that the essence of the number concept lies 
in the generation of the number sequence by the successive 
juxtaposition of units. This approach is quite alien to that 
taken by Frege, who ridiculed later treatments of number which 
are similar to Bolzano’s. (For one attack, see §§28-44 of 
Frege [1884].) Yet the fact that later mathematicians like 
Dedekind, Kronecker and Weierstrass were, at least for a time, 
attracted to a parallel conception of natural number, supports 
Bolzano’s view that he has articulated the ordinary concept 
(P. 17). Nor is he reluctant to face some implications of his 
definition. Indeed, he is at pains to poict out quickly that, 
on his view, such signs as ‘l/2,’ l/2,’ q-1,’ are “merely 
representations of numbers which do not refer to any object” 
(P. 17). 
The thesis that numbers are built up by accumulation of units 
is thus taken quite literally, and it leads Bolzano to a 
foundational position in which formalist and realist ideas are 
blended. There are anticipations of classic Fregean arguments 
for the objective existence of the positive natural numbers. 
Bolzano asks, rhetorically, how arithmetic could be so useful 
if there were no numbers (p. 26), and he insists that arithmetic 
outruns our power of intuition (p. 31). (The latter point is 
made in an interesting discussion of Kant's view of arithmetic.) 
Yet, from the very beginning of his work, Bolzano makes it clear 
that he believes that much of mathematics involves the manipu- 
lation of signs which, although meaningful, lack objective 
reference. 
Since some of the primitive properties of the natural numbers 
(for example, the principle of induction) flow immediately from 
Bolzano’s definition, it is, perhaps, hardly surprising that he 
does not attempt to isolate those properties in a system of axioms 
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He does note (p. 21) that the series of numbers does not contain 
loops, and there are brief discussions of the indefinite 
extendability of the operation which generates the numbers 
(p. 21, pp. 36-7). 
The next two sections pursue extensions of the positive 
natural number system. Negative numbers are introduced by 
generalizing the subtraction operation (pp. 52-3). Bolzano 
thinks of negative number signs as having objective reference, 
and as referring to concrete numbers which are generated through 
the juxtaposition of negative units (p. 53). However, '0' is 
viewed as an "objectless number-representation" (p. 25). 
Multiplication is introduced by considering the possibility 
of applying arithmetic to itself (pp. 55-7). We can form a 
number sequence generated by a unit which is itself a number. 
Suppose, for example, that we consider some indeterminate 
concrete number m, and form a sequence generated by units which 
are numbers of this kind. Then the product n x m is the number 
obtained by generating n out of the units which generate m; 
intuitively, n x m is the cardinality of the union of the 
members of n. Based on this definition, Bolzano proves 
fundamental results about multiplication, laws of associativity, 
commutativity, distributivity and so forth (pp. 62-3). 
Division is characterized as the inverse operation of 
multiplication (p. 67) and this leads, in section 4, to the 
development of rational number arithmetic. Bolzano's treatment 
here is explicitly formalistic. He asserts that the meanings 
which have been fixed for the primitive arithmetical signs permit 
us to form, and understand, expressions which are built up out 
of numerals and the symbols for addition, subtraction, multipli- 
cation and division. After explicitly allowing for complex 
expressions which contain an infinite number of occurrences 
of one (or more) of these symbols, he focuses his attention on 
the elementary expressions, expressions which only contain a 
finite number of such occurrences (pp. 73-4). According to the 
rules for manipulating the primitive symbols (rules which derive 
from the meanings assigned to those symbols), Bolzano can show 
that each elementary expression is reducible to an irreducible 
ratio (pp. 75-8). This result is stated as a syntactic 
metatheorem, and rational number expressions are later identified 
with elementary expressions (p. 79). (Interestingly enough, in 
proving his syntactic results, Bolzano anticipates the modern 
technique of using induction on the number of occurrences of 
particular types of symbols.) Since Bolzano does not believe 
that irreducible ratio expressions refer, he would not propose 
that his theorem demonstrates the closure of the rationals 
under the fundamental arithmetical operations. 
After a short section introducing the order predicate into 
the language of rational arithmetic, section 6 considers 
expressions containing variables which can take on indefinitely 
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large or indefinitely small values. Bolzano sometimes talks as 
though such expressions refer to "variable quantities" or to 
"numbers which grow," but I think that we can avoid attributing 
to him any such confusion. As he points out early on in the 
first section, he will sometimes use the term 'number' where it 
is more exact to use 'number representation' or 'number concept' 
(P. 22). In the light of this remark and of his formalist 
approach to rational arithmetic, a natural interpretation of 
section 6 is available. What is here at issue is the extension 
of the arithmetical language through the use of variables. 
In a similar way, we can arrive at a formalist interpretation 
of the rich final section. Jan Berg's helpful notes provide 
clear connections between Bolzarlols results and theorems of 
modern mathematics, drawing on excellent previous discussions 
in Rychlfk [1962], van Rootselaar [1966] and Laugwitz [1966]. 
The connection is eased by viewing Bolzano as identifying real 
numbers with sequences of ratios. An alternative approach is to 
take seriously Bolzano's talk of "infinite number expressions" 
which stand for "infinite number concepts." These infinite 
number expressions, briefly mentioned in section 4, are such 
expressions as '1 + 2 + 3 + . . . in. inf! and 'l/2 - l/4 + l/8 - 
l/16 + . . . in. inf.' Bolzano is anxious to quash the worry 
that we cannot understand them (p. lOl), but his stress on our 
recognition of the law of composition might lead us to wonder 
whether we can only operate with expressions which are built up 
in some simple recursive fashion. 
Bolzano's formalistic tendencies are manifest in his 
introduction of the central concept of measurability (pp. 102-4). 
An expression is measurable if and only if, given any positive 
natural number q, we can find an integer p such that the 
expression is reducible to 'p/q + P,' '(p+l)/q - P',' where 
'P,' 'P" are both purely positive expressions (that is, 
expressions built up without the subtraction sign). Instead of 
viewing measurability as a syntactic concept in this way, we 
could suppose that Bolzano is singling out a class of quantities 
(measurable numbers) which can be identified with sequences of 
rationals. The latter approach, which is adopted by Berg, has 
the advantage of giving an easy translation between Bolzano's 
theory and modern analysis. However, by attending to the 
discussion of expressions, I think we can obtain a firmer 
understanding of some of Bolzano's definitions and proofs. 
A formalist approach to mathematics is more interested in 
questions of consistency and of the possibility of finding 
particular types of representation than in questions of 
existence. The formalist's questions appear to come to the fore 
at crucial points in the final section of Bolzano's work. For 
example, there is a fairly lengthy discussion of the best ways 
of introducing identity and order predicates into the language 
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(pp. 129-135). The constraint guiding this procedure appears 
to be that of achieving a consistent extension which does not 
violate the meanings which have previously been assigned. 
Finding, for example, that his proposed definition of identity 
yields that l/(1+1+1+...) = 3/(1+1+1+1+...), Bolzano notes 
that he must restrict the standard rule for multiplication so 
that 'a/b = c/b1 is transformable into 'a = c' only when 'a,' 
'b,' 'c' are finite number expressions (pp. 132-3). His discussion 
thus explores the consequences of extending the language so as 
to preserve, insofar as possible, the laws of symbolic mani- 
pulation which reflect the meanings given to the primitive signs. 
Another place in which Bolzano's formalism seems evident is 
his attempt to prove a slightly different version of a theorem 
that had been central to his early attempts at "purely analytic 
proof" (see Bolzano [1817]; I have discussed the early proof in 
my [1975]). In the new formulation, the theorem states that, 
for every sequence < . . . , s n' . . . > such that, for all values 
of N, there is an n 
0’ 
such that for all positive integral r, 
ISnO - 'n + r] < l/N, there exists a measurable number A such 
0 
that ]A - sn/ tends to zero (p. 151). This looks, of course, 
like an existence theorem. Yet Bolzano spends little time in 
establishing the existence of limits to such sequences, but 
occupies himself with showing that the limits are measurable. 
We can make sense of this approach by adopting a syntactic 
perspective. The expression specifying the n?h member of the 
sequence can be viewed as a variable number expression, and the 
task reconstrued as that of showing that the expression is always 
measurable. This interpretation not only makes Bolzano's new 
attempt to prove the theorem more comprehensible, but it also 
illuminates some obscure remarks in the earlier proof. (However, 
it should not be concluded that the new proof is entirely satis- 
factory; there appears to be a large lacuna in the treatment of 
oscillatory sequences at p. 154.) 
There are many other interesting points in the final section 
of the volume. Bolzano applies his theorem on convergence to 
derive a version of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem (pp. 156-60). 
He also introduces the topological concepts of open and closed 
intervals, and of isolated points (p. 141). Finally, he seems 
to recognize that continuous domains have the property which 
Dedekind later made fundamental to his theory of real numbers 
(pp. 160-3). 
The editor's notes are generally informative, and, as I 
have already remarked, especially so in the final section. It 
is a pity that Berg did not provide a longer introduction, which 
could have supplied a detailed overview of the work. One minor 
point should be corrected. On p. 8, Berg hails Bolzano as a 
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precursor of the Frege-Russell definition of number. As mentioned 
above, Bolzano's discussion of concrete numbers is quite at 
variance with Frege, and abstract numbers, which play a very 
minor role in Bolzano's system, can only be connected with 
Frege's analysis if we assume that Bolzano's "properties" are 
akin to Frege's "courses-of-values." Overall, however, the 
careful scholarship which is exhibited in Berg's edition deserves 
our thanks. 
Bolzano's views on the foundations of mathematics are worth 
studying not only because he anticipated some imporant later 
ideas, but because he advanced some original and subtle views 
which have not been elaborated since. This extremely welcome 
volume testifies both to his originality and to his subtlety. 
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Sometime around 1639 Florimond (II) de Beaune (1601-1652), 
now best known for his Notae breves published in the 1649 Latin 
edition of Descartes's Geometria, drafted the first half of a 
two-book study of the solid angle. In it he meant to emulate 
what had been achieved for the plane and spherical triangle. 
That is, given three elements (sides, angles, or a combination 
thereof) of either sort of triangle, one could determine the 
